The Prince: Chapter 13
Today we look at the thirteenth chapter of Niccolo Machiavelli’s “The Prince“. This chapter is “Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops”, and really constitutes the second part of a two-chapter discussion of the dangers of relying on the military forces of others. Whereas N.M. seems to have a deep hatred of mercenaries, he seems to merely consider the use of auxiliary forces (i.e. forces controlled by an ally) to be dangerous and unwise. This has more relevance to Facebook app developers than you might think.
Summary
N.M. begins:
When one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his forces, they are termed auxiliaries and are as useless as mercenaries.
N.M.’s objections to auxiliaries are related to those he raises against mercenaries: chiefly that “if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner”.
Danger
N.M. points out that whereas mercenaries are dangerous primarily due to their weakness and incompetence, auxiliaries are dangerous due to their unity and strength. A prince who uses the forces of another to conquer territory finds that territory instantly occupied by those forces of another; mercenaries might take some time to organize themselves to betray their employer, but auxiliaries are always ready to turn on him.
Examples
N.M. sort of goes all Dale Carnegie in this chapter, with a fairly large number of examples and anecdotes that support (but don’t add much to) his central point. For example, he approvingly (again) cites Cesare Borgia for the way in which he (perforce) began his conquest of the Romagna with French auxiliaries, then switched to the mercenary forces of the Orsini and Vitelli (which were less dangerous to him), and finally switched to his own forces once he was able.
N.M. also praises Hiero of Syracuse, who upon taking power found his military dependent on mercenaries. Hiero had these forces “cut in pieces”[!] as he thought it unsafe to either dismiss them or to continue to employ them. (I assume N.M. is not being metaphorical here.) N.M. commends Charles VII for raising native French infantry, and condemns Louis XI for disbanding it. And so on.
Latin
N.M. quotes the Latin maxim:
[Q]uod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixae
which, as I’m sure you know, translates (roughly) as: “Nothing is so weak and unstable as a reputation for power that is not based on one’s own strength”. That pretty much sums up N.M.’s views on mercenary and auxiliary forces.
Why Do I Care?
You might well ask: “What is the relevance of all this to me?” Well, if you are in business, I think that the ideas found in the last two chapters are useful to keep in mind if you’re considering outsourcing, “strategic partnerships”, or building something on someone else’s “platform”.
N.M. writes of the French:
… France has disheartened all her own troops, the infantry having been abolished and the men-at-arms being obliged to foreigners for assistance; for being accustomed to fight with French troops, they think they cannot conquer without them. Whence it comes that the French are insufficiently strong to oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss they will not venture against others.
This, it seems to me, is a cautionary tale about outsourcing your “core competencies”. (N.M. views warfare as the core competency of a prince, as we shall soon see.) Excessive reliance on outsiders can condition your organization for helplessness and dependence.
As for partnerships and platforms; these can provide great leverage to your efforts, but you must always be mindful that your “partners” thereby gain great leverage over you. The best thing about developing for open platforms (of which the Web is a great example) is that you’re not depending on someone who might decide to cut your throat for his own profit.
Tags: The Prince