Things that were not immediately obvious to me

We now turn, at last, to Chapter 2 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — which deals with “Integrating Civilian and Military Activities”. As the FM puts it, in its deathless prose:

This chapter begins with the principles involved in integrating the activities of military and civilian organizations during counterinsurgency operations. It then describes the categories of organizations usually involved. After that, it discusses assignment of responsibilities and mechanisms used to integrate civilian and military activities. It concludes by listing information commanders need to know about civilian agencies operating in their area of operations.

Today, we’re just going to look at the “principles”. Which boil down to: everyone (U.S. forces, host nation forces, sympathetic elements of civil society, sympathetic international organizations, etc.) should be on the same page, but, gosh darn it, that’s hard to achieve. The two basic problems are:

• Many potentially helpful organizations are outside the military’s chain of command, and not about to submit to it.
• A too-obvious chain of command can be counterproductive if it undermines the perceived independence of potentially helpful organizations in the eyes of those that COIN forces are seeking to persuade.

The FM puts it this way:

Interagency partners, NGOs, and private organizations have many interests and agendas that military forces cannot control. Additionally, local legitimacy is frequently affected by the degree to which local institutions are perceived as independent and capable without external support.

This section contains a few other noteworthy bits.

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I want to make some brief remarks as to my overall reaction to Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — before moving on to Chapter 2. This isn’t a summary of the chapter (as the FM is essentially pre-summarized), nor a catalog of everything I found noteworthy (that’s contained in the previous — ugh — 10 posts), but rather a description of my strongest subjective impressions.

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Concluding our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we come to a discussion of the “paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations” and a summary table of “successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices”.

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Continuing with our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we now look at the FM’s “Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency”: i.e., more stuff to consider, that’s (presumably) only come to light recently.

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Continuing with our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we come to some introductory remarks on COIN itself, and a review of its historical principles.

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Continuing with our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we now consider some potential insurgent vulnerabilities. Here’s the list:

• Insurgents’ need for secrecy.
• Inconsistencies in the mobilization message.
• Need to establish a base of operations.
• Reliance on external support.
• Need to obtain financial resources.
• Internal divisions.
• Need to maintain momentum.
• Informants within the insurgency.

Some brief remarks on each may be found below.

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Continuing with our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we take a look at the forces that shape the insurgency. These factors influence the general approach the insurgency will adopt, and the relative importance of its component parts.

The FM lists 6 “dynamics” of an insurgency:

• Leadership.
• Objectives.
• Ideology and narrative.
• Environment and geography.
• External support and sanctuaries.
• Phasing and timing.

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Continuing with our review of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — we come to a description of the elements of an insurgency, and some concrete remarks on necessary force levels.

Force Level

The force level stuff is worth quoting up front:

During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely. A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an [area of operation]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.

In case you’re wondering, Afghanistan has a population of about 29 million, suggesting a requirement for at least 580,000 counterinsurgents. The Afghan National Army (ANA) currently numbers 134,000. The Afghan National Police (ANP) account for another 90,000 men. There might be another 100,000 American, 10,000 British, and I’m going to hand-wave another 10,000 counterinsurgents from the rest of the world. That’s 344,000. Now, massive increases are planned for the ANA and ANP, but you can see what we’re dealing with here.

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Let’s return to Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — as we continue to nibble away at the book. This next bit addresses the question of “mobilization”, and tosses in some remarks on crime.

The FM, as we’ve already seen, takes the view that insurgents and counterinsurgents are essentially in a struggle for political legitimacy. In such a conflict, victory is achieved when the mass of people support one side or the other. The FM discusses three aspects of mobilizing such support: means, causes, and resources. The “resources” section isn’t too interesting; as a summary, “send lawyers, guns, and money” makes up in brevity what it lacks in accuracy.

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Let’s look at some more of Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 — the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual — as we continue to nibble away at the book. Here are some more points that I found interesting.

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